英语翻译The above papers and most other recent work on bank capital regulation assume perfectlyelastic supplies of assets and demands for liabilities on the part of the public.In contrast,Hellmann et al.(2000) consider a setting with monopolistic

英语翻译The above papers and most other recent work on bank capital regulation assume perfectlyelastic supplies of assets and demands for liabilities on the part of the public.In contrast,Hellmann et al.(2000) consider a setting with monopolistic
英语翻译
The above papers and most other recent work on bank capital regulation assume perfectly
elastic supplies of assets and demands for liabilities on the part of the public.In contrast,
Hellmann et al.(2000) consider a setting with monopolistically competitive deposit
markets,in which the perfectly competitive limit of infinite elasticity of deposit supply
yields a deposit rate equal to the riskless rate and a representative bank earns no profits.
A representative bank can choose between holding a riskless (‘‘prudent’’) asset with known
return or a risky (‘‘gambling’’) asset with a random return,which in a successful state is
higher than the riskless asset’s return.The opportunity cost of capital is higher than the
rate of return on the riskless asset.If the bank chooses the risky asset and earns the lower
return,it fails.An equilibrium deposit rate above a critical threshold yields each representative
bank greater expected returns than investing in the riskless asset.Hence,in an
unregulated deposit-market equilibrium,banks hold undiversified portfolios consisting
only of risky assets.Imposing sufficiently stringent capital regulation – which Hellmann
et al.express as a flat ratio in relation to total deposits – reduces banks’ incentive to mobilize
as many deposits to fund risky assets and hence is Pareto improving,although when
returns on assets and bank capital are endogenous,banks’ incentives to take on greater
asset risk increase when capital requirements are toughened.Hellmann et al.conclude,
however,that combining a deposit rate ceiling (for an earlier examination of issues relating
to deposit rate ceilings,see Lam and Chen (1985)) with capital regulation can unambiguously
induce all banks to reduce investment in risky assets.Thus,Hellmann et al.provide a
rationale for coupling capital regulation with deposit rate ceilings,effectively rejuvenating
the old idea that unrestrained competition in bank deposit markets makes banks less safe.

英语翻译The above papers and most other recent work on bank capital regulation assume perfectlyelastic supplies of assets and demands for liabilities on the part of the public.In contrast,Hellmann et al.(2000) consider a setting with monopolistic
上述文件和其他大部分银行资本监管的近期工作承担完美
的资产和对公众的一部分负债用品的需求弹性.与此相反,
好乐门等. （2000年）审议与垄断竞争存款的设置
市场,其中的存款无限弹性完全竞争的限制供应
产生一个存款利率等于无风险利率和银行的代表没有赚取利润.
一位代表银行可以选择持有无风险（''谨慎''）与已知资产
返回或有风险（赌博'' ''）,以随机的回报,一个成功的国家,则资产
高于无风险资产的回报.资本的机会成本高于高
率的无风险资产的回报.如果银行选择的风险资产和收入较低
回报,它失败.高于一个临界值每一位代表的均衡收益率存款利率
银行更大的预期比无风险资产的投资回报.因此,在一
管制存款市场的均衡,由单一的银行持有的投资组合
只有高风险资产.实行严格的资本监管不够 - 这赫尔曼
等.作为与存款总额的比率表示单位 - 降低银行的积极性调动
许多存款资金风险资产,因此是帕累托改善,虽然当
银行的资产和资本回报是内生的,银行的激励机制,以承担更大
资产风险增加的资本要求是锻炼.好乐门等.最后,
然而,结合存款利率上限（对有关问题的早期检查
对存款利率上限,看到资本监管林,陈（1985））可以明确地
促使所有银行降低风险资产的投资.因此,好乐门等.提供一
理据耦合与存款利率上限资本监管,有效地恢复活力
旧的观念,在银行存款的市场无节制的竞争,使得银行更安全.
该翻译 仅供参考