英语翻译求专业点的翻译.可供我方选择的谈判策略：以量换价战略往年中方的谈判策略是我们宝钢来代表国内钢铁行业和三大铁矿石巨头和澳方谈,不过我们宝钢谈判时提出的需求量只代表

英语翻译求专业点的翻译.可供我方选择的谈判策略：以量换价战略往年中方的谈判策略是我们宝钢来代表国内钢铁行业和三大铁矿石巨头和澳方谈,不过我们宝钢谈判时提出的需求量只代表
英语翻译
求专业点的翻译.
可供我方选择的谈判策略：
以量换价战略
往年中方的谈判策略是我们宝钢来代表国内钢铁行业和三大铁矿石巨头和澳方谈,不过我们宝钢谈判时提出的需求量只代表我们自己,其他钢厂则是等待宝钢谈出结果后再跟随.今年中方的谈判代表还是我们宝钢,不过此次其手中所握的筹码比往年重了很多：中钢协在充分摸底的基础上,把全国主要钢厂今年的铁矿石需求量汇总起来交给我们谈,这个“总量”的效应无疑对中方更有利.
不设时限战略
今年中方谈判的基本原则是在总量的基础上,三大铁矿石巨头谁出的条件更好,我们就先跟谁谈.至于何时能谈出结果来,我们可以不设时限.谈判常常是处于心态稳定的一方获得最后的胜利,对谈判时间不设硬性规定,什么时候结束谈判要由双方来决定.只要澳大利亚力和力拓集团比我们更早焦急那就有我们的机会.即便6月底谈判没有结果,这也不会影响到国内大钢厂的生产经营活动
放弃事先谈判协议战略
我们中方之前与澳大利亚屡次谈判受压制的一个较大原因是我们中国钢协对合理的新定价公式过去并没有研究,也没有充分的准备,仓促上阵,这样失败的概率当然要远远大于成功.我认为,这次的谈判如果我们希望取得较好结果,就必须放弃中国钢协前不久设定的一些谈判目标以及与力和力拓达成的协议.在策略上,我们应该放手让日韩欧美先谈定价格,我们随后跟进,可能对我们利益最大.
主要理由是：
⑴ 中国和韩日、欧美钢铁市场形势不一样.我国钢铁产品市场价格虽然不算太好,但总体来说还可以说是产销两旺,企业开工率很高.产品和对原料都有涨价的要求和心理准备.而日韩、欧美钢铁市场都仍在复苏之中,产能利用率低于中国,市场压力比我们大,保持低成本的要求比我们更为强烈；
⑵ 与我国同时存在铁矿石两个市场,两套价格不同,日韩欧美钢铁企业几乎100%依赖长协矿.三巨头和我国谈判,最有力的证据就是我国国内地矿粉市场价和进口现货价显著高于长协价,而我们还不太好反驳.而日韩欧美大钢企不存在这个问题；
⑶ 日韩欧美等大钢企产品以供应下游战略客户为主,期限长,比例高,希望早早锁定成本,尽量采用固定价格.而我国钢铁企业,除个别外,一年以上的长期战略供应合同比例均不大.多数钢铁企业和钢铁产品用户习惯于波动的市场价格.因此,发达国家心目中的理想矿石成本一定低于我们.
基于以上三条理由,我们认为今年我国钢铁企业取得低于日韩欧美长协价的可能可以说基本不存在.在这种情况下,最好的策略大概就是直接与日韩欧等钢铁企业沟通（或按兵不动）,告诉他们,我们不和他们争抢首发,愿意随时跟进.（最近在和一些钢铁业界人士沟通时,我惊喜地发现,“让日韩先谈,我们跟进”的想法竟然和大多数人不谋而合.）我们不要再盲目追求什么不切实际的“中国模式”,还是应该以中国钢铁企业利益最大化为最高标准.
不设最终底线战略
对新一轮进口铁矿石长协价谈判我们中方必然会包含四个主要目标：
1、 以中国财年为合同期（1月1号起执行新年度价）；
2、 批量优惠,量大折扣应多；
3、 全国统一价；
4、 中国不“盲目跟进”其他国家的谈判结果.
这四项被认为是铁矿石“中国模式”的核心要素.但我认为,这四项如果只是作为中方的出价条件,是可谈判、可改变的,当然可以,但如果是作为不可改变的底线,则必然对中国实际利益极为不利.没有什么是不变的底线,只要我方的利益还可以扩大化,完全可以让力拓认为我们的最终底线在一个更高的起点上.
扩大我方优势战略
在具体谈判中让力拓意识我方的优势毫无疑问能给我方更多的优势.所有我们必须要坚持“量大价优”原则,“最大买家优惠”原则,
我加到300分了

英语翻译求专业点的翻译.可供我方选择的谈判策略：以量换价战略往年中方的谈判策略是我们宝钢来代表国内钢铁行业和三大铁矿石巨头和澳方谈,不过我们宝钢谈判时提出的需求量只代表
可供我方选择的谈判策略：
Available options of bargaining tactics for our side.
以量换价战略
往年中方的谈判策略是我们宝钢来代表国内钢铁行业和三大铁矿石巨头和澳方谈,不过我们宝钢谈判时提出的需求量只代表我们自己,其他钢厂则是等待宝钢谈出结果后再跟随.今年中方的谈判代表还是我们宝钢,不过此次其手中所握的筹码比往年重了很多：中钢协在充分摸底的基础上,把全国主要钢厂今年的铁矿石需求量汇总起来交给我们谈,这个“总量”的效应无疑对中方更有利.
The quantity-exchange-lower price strategy
The former negotiating tactic of the Chinese side was to appoint Baosteel to negotiate with the three iron ore mining giants and Australia on behalf of the country’s steel makers. However, the quantity demanded in the negotiation by Baosteel was for own consumption; other steel makers would only follow suit after Baosteel had yielded result from the negotiations. The negotiating representative for the Chinese side this year is still Baosteel; but the bargaining chips in hand are much heavier than in previous years. After a full scale investigation on the required quantity of the country’s steel mills, the China Iron & Steel Association (CISA) has assigned the aggregate quantity to us for the negotiation; the effect of this “total quantity” will definitely be advantageous to the Chinese side.
不设时限战略
今年中方谈判的基本原则是在总量的基础上,三大铁矿石巨头谁出的条件更好,我们就先跟谁谈.至于何时能谈出结果来,我们可以不设时限.谈判常常是处于心态稳定的一方获得最后的胜利,对谈判时间不设硬性规定,什么时候结束谈判要由双方来决定.只要澳大利亚力和力拓集团比我们更早焦急那就有我们的机会.即便6月底谈判没有结果,这也不会影响到国内大钢厂的生产经营活动
The strategy of setting no deadline
This year, the basic negotiating principle of the Chinese side is that we will first commence talks with whichever of the three mining giants that can offer the best conditions on the basis of the “total quantity”. We will not set any time limit for a fruitful result. It is always the party with the equable mindset that ultimately prevails in a negotiation; there will be no rigid adherence to the negotiating time frame, when to end the talks will be decided by both parties. If BHP Billiton starts to get anxious earlier than us, that is our chance. Even if there is no conclusion to the talks at the end of June, it will not affect the productions and operations of the major steel mills in the country.
放弃事先谈判协议战略
我们中方之前与澳大利亚屡次谈判的一个较大原因是我们中国钢协对合理的新定价公式过去并没有研究,也没有充分的准备,仓促上阵,这样失败的概率当然要远远大于成功.我认为,这次的谈判如果我们希望取得较好结果,就必须放弃中国钢协前不久设定的一些谈判目标以及与力和力拓达成的协议.在策略上,我们应该放手让日韩欧美先谈定价格,我们随后跟进,可能对我们利益最大.
The strategy of discarding previous agreements
One of the main reasons why the Chinese side was kept down by the Australians time and again in the talks was that the CISA never studied the reasonable new pricing formula, and went into the battle hastily without full preparation; of course in this way the odds were against us. In my opinion, if we wish to achieve better results in the talks this time, we must give up the negotiation targets lately set up by the CISA and the agreement reached with BHP. Strategically, we should let Japan and South Korea to agree on a price with BHP first before we step in, this may be most beneficial to us.
主要理由是：
⑴ 中国和韩日、欧美钢铁市场形势不一样.我国钢铁产品市场价格虽然不算太好,但总体来说还可以说是产销两旺,企业开工率很高.产品和对原料都有涨价的要求和心理准备.而日韩、欧美钢铁市场都仍在复苏之中,产能利用率低于中国,市场压力比我们大,保持低成本的要求比我们更为强烈；
The main reasons are:
1. The market situations in Japan, South Korea, Europe and the U.S. are different from that of China. Despite the prices of steel products are not very good in the China market, the overall production and sales are considered thriving and the companies’ rate of operation is very high; there are demands as well as mental preparation for price increases in products and raw materials. While the Japan, South Korea, Europe and the U.S. steel markets are still in the course of recovery, their capacity utilizations are lower than China and the market pressures are much heavier, so they have a stronger desire to keep their costing at a minimum.
⑵ 与我国同时存在铁矿石两个市场,两套价格不同,日韩欧美钢铁企业几乎100%依赖长协矿.三巨头和我国谈判,最有力的证据就是我国国内地矿粉市场价和进口现货价显著高于长协价,而我们还不太好反驳.而日韩欧美大钢企不存在这个问题；
2. In China, there are two iron ore markets with two sets of different prices, while the enterprises in Japan, South Korea, Europe and the U.S. almost 100% rely on a long-term supply agreement. In the negotiation between China and the three mining giants, the biggest piece of evidence is the market price of local fine ore and the spot price of imported fine ore are significantly higher than the long-term agreement price, yet we are unable to really refute it; while the major steelmakers in Japan, South Korea, Europe and the U.S. have no such problem.
⑶ 日韩欧美等大钢企产品以供应下游战略客户为主,期限长,比例高,希望早早锁定成本,尽量采用固定价格.而我国钢铁企业,除个别外,一年以上的长期战略供应合同比例均不大.多数钢铁企业和钢铁产品用户习惯于波动的市场价格.因此,发达国家心目中的理想矿石成本一定低于我们.
The major steelmakers in Japan, South Korea, Europe and the U.S. main supply to their downstream strategic clienteles with long term and high proportion; they hope to fix the costs early and try to adopt fixed prices. Other than individual exception, the percentage of long-term strategic supply contracts of more than one year is very small for all the China’s steel enterprises. Most of them and the steel product consumers have become accustomed to the fluctuating market prices. Therefore, the ideal iron ore costing of the developed countries is definitely lower than ours.
基于以上三条理由,我们认为今年我国钢铁企业取得低于日韩欧美长协价的可能可以说基本不存在.在这种情况下,最好的策略大概就是直接与日韩欧等钢铁企业沟通（或按兵不动）,告诉他们,我们不和他们争抢首发,愿意随时跟进.（最近在和一些钢铁业界人士沟通时,我惊喜地发现,“让日韩先谈,我们跟进”的想法竟然和大多数人不谋而合.）我们不要再盲目追求什么不切实际的“中国模式”,还是应该以中国钢铁企业利益最大化为最高标准.
Based on the above three reasons, we think that the possibility of China’s steel enterprises getting a price offer lower than the Japan, South Korea, Europe and the U.S. long-term agreement price is basically non-existent. The best tactic would be to communicate with them directly (or stay put), and tell them we will not jostle for first position but are willing to follow up anytime. (During recent exchanges with people in the steel industry, I was pleasantly surprised to discover that most of them happened to hold the same view of “Let Japan and South Korea talk first and then we follow in”). We should not blindly pursue the unrealistic “China style”, instead, we should treat the optimal interest of China’s steel enterprises as the highest standard.
不设最终底线战略
对新一轮进口铁矿石长协价谈判我们中方必然会包含四个主要目标：
1、 以中国财年为合同期（1月1号起执行新年度价）；
2、 批量优惠,量大折扣应多；
3、 全国统一价；
4、 中国不“盲目跟进”其他国家的谈判结果.
这四项被认为是铁矿石“中国模式”的核心要素.但我认为,这四项如果只是作为中方的出价条件,是可谈判、可改变的,当然可以,但如果是作为不可改变的底线,则必然对中国实际利益极为不利.没有什么是不变的底线,只要我方的利益还可以扩大化,完全可以让力拓认为我们的最终底线在一个更高的起点上.
The strategy of not setting ultimate bottom line
For the new round of talks concerning the long-term agreement price of iron ore, the Chinese side has four major objectives:
1.The contract period will be based on Chinese fiscal year (the new annual price shall begin from January 1st);
2.Preferential price for batch quantity, more discount for large quantity;
3.One unified price for the whole country;
4.China will not blindly follow other country’s negotiated price.
These four objectives are considered the core elements of “Chinese style” for iron ore. In my opinion, it is acceptable of course if these four items are the negotiable and changeable conditions of offer by the Chinese side; but if they are considered as the immutable bottom line, then it is detrimental to the actual interest of China. There is no unchangeable bottom line, as long as there is still room to extend our benefits, we can by all means let Rio Tinto to raise our ultimate bottom line.
扩大我方优势战略
在具体谈判中让力拓意识我方的优势毫无疑问能给我方更多的优势.所有我们必须要坚持“量大价优”原则,“最大买家优惠”原则,
The strategy of magnifying our advantage
Making Rio Tinto to be aware of our advantage during specific negotiation will no doubt give us more superiority. So we must insist on the principles of “large quantity, better price” and “Biggest buyer preferential treatment”.
【英语牛人团】