英语翻译While many of the essays contained in the three special AAA issues mentioned earlier speak to the “how” of earnings management [Nelson et al,2003; Sack,2002; Swain et al,2002; and Nelson et al,2002,among others],at least one [Arya,Glo

英语翻译While many of the essays contained in the three special AAA issues mentioned earlier speak to the “how” of earnings management [Nelson et al,2003; Sack,2002; Swain et al,2002; and Nelson et al,2002,among others],at least one [Arya,Glo
英语翻译
While many of the essays contained in the three special AAA issues mentioned earlier speak to the “how” of earnings management [Nelson et al,2003; Sack,2002; Swain et al,2002; and Nelson et al,2002,among others],at least one [Arya,Glover,and Sunder,2003] asks the question,“Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders?” They contend that “income manipulation is not an unmitigated evil; within limits,it promotes efficient decisions” (p.111) and cite management’s ability to distinguish transient changes in income from permanent income better than external users.(After all,the investing public doesn’t really want to know what a firm made this year; they are really only interested in its promise for the future.) Hodge [2003] finds that,although perceived earnings quality has declined over time,the perceived relevance of financial information has actually increased.Thus,on one hand,earnings management seems foe; on the other it is friend.Clikeman [2002] recognizes the problems of measuring earnings for companies in the information age,a situation that,again,invites some type of earnings management by insiders who might have an “edge” in valuing a firm’s future promise.If earnings quality is synonymous with repeatability/sustainability,then earnings management might be necessary to ensure quality,not in conflict with it.Finally,Entwistle and Phillips [2003] make laudable arguments for both sides of the relevance/reliability tradeoff and the manage-earnings/do-not-manage-earnings implications.

英语翻译While many of the essays contained in the three special AAA issues mentioned earlier speak to the “how” of earnings management [Nelson et al,2003; Sack,2002; Swain et al,2002; and Nelson et al,2002,among others],at least one [Arya,Glo
虽然在这三个问题特别AAA级所载文章前面提到的许多发言,“如何”的盈余管理[纳尔逊等人,2003年;麻袋,2002;斯温等人,2002年;和尼尔森等人,2002年,除其他] ,至少有一个[阿里亚,格洛弗,和破甲,2003]问一个问题,“是非经营收入为股东总是更好?”他们争辩说,“收入操纵是不是一个十足的邪恶;在一定限度内,它可以促进效率的决定”（第.111）,引用管理的能力,区分永久收入收入比外部的用户提供更好的瞬态变化.（毕竟,投资大众并不真正想知道什么是坚定的,让今年,他们真的是只有在其对未来的希望感兴趣.）霍奇[2003]认为,虽然认为随着时间的推移盈余质量下降,财务信息的相关性反而增加了知觉.因此,一方面,盈余管理似乎敌人,另一方面它是朋友.Clikeman [2002]承认测量在信息时代,这种情况,再次邀请一些业内人士对盈余管理的类型谁可能有一个“优势”在评估一个公司的未来的希望公司盈利的问题.如果盈余品质的代名词重复性/可持续性,那么可能是必要的盈余管理,以确保不与它冲突的质量.最后,恩特威斯尔和菲利普斯[2003]弥补双方的相关性/可靠性的权衡和manage-earnings/do-not-manage-earnings影响值得称赞的论点.