what can we learn from the way USA treated japan on foreign trade 帮写篇作文,很着急,

what can we learn from the way USA treated japan on foreign trade 帮写篇作文,很着急,
what can we learn from the way USA treated japan on foreign trade 帮写篇作文,很着急,

what can we learn from the way USA treated japan on foreign trade 帮写篇作文,很着急,
Since joining the WTO,China has had to face more and more trade frictions.How to handle trade frictions with major trading partners has become a pressing issue.
As China and Japan share some similarities in terms of development models and exports composition,it鈥檚 necessary to learn from Japan鈥檚 experience handling US-Japan trade frictions.
Japan鈥檚 most distinct feature in dealing with trade frictions is using industrial structure adjustment policies to cope with trade disputes.
This is related to the function of its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),the agency in charge of trade management and counter-friction.
The structural adjustment policies worked in past US-Japan trade frictions through two aspects:through direct overseas investment to produce outside of Japan and to export directly to a third country,and thus work around the trade barriers,and the upgrading of domestic industries and the transformation of the labor-intensive industries into capital-intensive,heavy chemical industry,then technique-intensive and service industries.
The direct investment avoided and softened conflicts,and indirectly stimulated exports.By building all kinds of economic connections with local US enterprises,Japan also gained easier access to high-tech applications and could improve the international competitiveness of domestic companies.For example,the dispute over color televisions in the 1970s directly stimulated the Japanese color television industry鈥檚 direct investment in the US.
The dispute started in 1968 when the Import Committee affiliated with the American Electronic Industries Alliance appealed to the US Department of Commerce,asking the government to impose a quota on Japanese imports.
The appeal fell through,but Japanese television makers,including Sony,Panasonic and Sanyo,set up offices in the US in the early 1970s.Mass production started after 1976 鈥 when the dispute was most fierce 鈥 and climaxed between 1978 and 1979.Until the end of the decade,Japanese companies producing color televisions on US soil outnumbered Japanese exports to the US,and hence ended the friction.
Besides overseas investment,Japan has also been continuously upgrading the structure of domestic industries.
During the post-war era when the economy was recovering,Japan鈥檚 pillar industry was still light industry,mainly fibers.The country adopted strict protections in trade policies,restricting imports and foreign direct investments.Large quantities of textile exports created adequate foreign exchange for the heavy chemical industries to introduce technologies,upgrade equipment,and purchase raw materials.
Once the heavy chemical industries took off,Japan started to change strategy,using imports to substitute and eventually eliminate the 鈥渟unset industries鈥 and upgrade its industrial structure.By the 1960s,heavy chemical industries had completely replaced light and textile industries and became the pillar of exports.And Japan shifted to an export-oriented trading strategy,with heavy chemical products making up more of the total exports.Japan鈥檚 trade policies accelerated the process of upgrading the industrial structure.
Due to the State-dominated development model and its economic strategy after the World War II,Japan鈥檚 structural adjustment and trade frictions interact this way:the aggravating of trade frictions accelerates the structural adjustment,prompts trade policies that push forward the adjustment,while the adjustment in turn resolves the trade frictions.
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Japan and China each account for around 9% of U.S.international trade.Americans have historically had a large trade deficit with Japan,as American consumers highly value many Japanese electronic products.
Japanese-American exchange rate and international trade data for 2002 and 2003 is located on the bottom of this article.The column JPN YEN indicates how many Japanese Yen can be purchased with 1 U.S.Dollar.An increase in this number represents a strengthened (apperciated) U.S.Dollar,and a decrease in this number represents a weakened (depreciated) one.The column JPN DEF indicates the size of the trade balance the U.S.has with Japan.All the numbers in that column are negative,indicating that the United States has a trade deficit with Japan.The numbers are in millions of U.S.Dollars,so -6436.60 across from Oct-03 indicates that U.S.trade deficit with Japan was 6.4 billion dollars for the month of October 2003.
The U.S.Dollar has depreciated significantly against the Japanese Yen for the last 2 years,with 1 U.S.Dollar buying 132 yen at the beginning of 2002 but only 109 yen in October 2003,a drop of 17.5%.During this time the trade deficit has become larger,with the third largest trade deficit in the last 22 months occuring in the last month of the sample.Interestingly the correlation between movements in the exchange rates and movements in the trade balance is zero,indicating that there is no relationship between changes in the two.I'm not sure what this data is telling us.One interesting thing to note is that the largest trade deficit in this sample occured during December.This is likely because consumers increase their expenditure on Japanese made gifts around Christmas.
Like the Canadian-American data,the Japanese-American data tells us little about why the U.S.trade deficit remains so large.While the U.S.Dollar has fallen considerably against the Japanese Yen,the trade deficit continues to grow larger,which is contrary to our intitution.Perhaps China,like Mexico,can shed some light on the situation.